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abstRact. this article examines various political strategies employed by Nemaska crees in northern Quebec to defend 
their land and way of life against the EM-1-a & Rupert Diversion Project. Notwithstanding the regional cree leadership’s 
endorsement of the project and the ambivalence of the majority of the local community toward the project, a local resistance 
group composed of committed individuals from the Nemaska cree community demonstrated a remarkable capacity to engage 
in a range of political strategies to voice their opposition to the hydroelectric expansion project. although construction of 
the project is now underway, our findings affirm the role and significance of individuals and organizations operating at the 
local level in articulating and framing efforts to enhance local empowerment and governance and respond to the ecological 
degradation imposed by large-scale industrial development on the “local.”
key words: local resistance movement, EM-1-a & Rupert Diversion Project, political strategies, large-scale industrial 
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RÉsuMÉ. Le présent article examine diverses stratégies politiques employées par les cris de Nemaska du nord du Québec 
dans le but de défendre leur territoire et leur mode de vie contre le Projet de l’Eastmain-1-a-Rupert. Nonobstant l’appui des 
chefs cris régionaux et l’ambivalence de la majorité de la communauté locale à l’égard de ce projet, un groupe de résistance 
local composé de particuliers dévoués de la communauté crie de Nemaska a démontré une capacité remarquable à adopter 
diverses stratégies politiques afin de communiquer son opposition au projet d’agrandissement hydroélectrique. Bien que les 
travaux de construction soient déjà en cours, nos observations ont pour effet d’affirmer le rôle et l’importance des particuliers 
et des organisations à l’échelle locale quand vient le temps d’articuler et d’encadrer des efforts pour renforcer l’autonomie et la 
gouvernance locales et réagir à la dégradation écologique découlant de la mise en valeur industrielle à grande échelle pour les 
gens de la région.
Mots clés : mouvement de résistance local, Projet de l’Eastmain-1-a-Rupert, stratégies politiques, mise en valeur industrielle à 
grande échelle, cri de la baie James, communauté, incidences sociales et environnementales
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iNtRoDuctioN
Globalizing forces of economic development, specifically 
those involving the extraction of raw materials for capitalist 
development, have had direct and far-reaching impacts on 
indigenous peoples’ rights to land and livelihood (Kunitz, 
2000; clark, 2002; ishiyama, 2003; coates, 2004; Gedicks, 
2004; stewart-Harawira, 2005). coates (2004:216) asserts 
that the periods shaped by wartime and the post-war era 
represent the most dramatic and destructive transforma-
tions of indigenous populations around the world:
the imperatives of the industrial world, which 
needed energy, minerals, wood and pulp, regardless 
of political ideology or government structure, drove 
nations to move aggressively into remote regions. in 
very few instances…did the national governments take 
the concerns and needs of indigenous peoples very 
seriously.
indigenous peoples around the world have continued to 
be discriminated against while the pace of intrusive large-
scale resource development on their territories has acceler-
ated (stewart-Harawira, 2005). in many instances, states 
have been complicit in creating social structures that pro-
mote an unequal distribution of power and resources, and 
consequently, unequal life chances. the resulting forms of 
structural violence, including inequality, injustice, racism, 
poverty, marginalization, and exclusion, have all too often 
characterized the experience of indigenous peoples with 
industrial-scale development (see Galtung, 1996; Farmer et 
al., 2006).
indigenous groups, however, have not been completely 
powerless against Western capitalist and industrialist 
forces. As Stahler-Sholk (2001:493) notes, globalization 
creates new and fertile ground upon which indigenous 
groups can challenge authoritative power: “Globalization 
can paradoxically open new political space for contesta-
tion as it ruptures existing patterns of relations between 
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state and civil society.” in recent decades, the political 
struggle of indigenous groups to maintain their autonomy, 
defend their cultures and protect their ancestral lands has 
led to the emergence of a strong indigenous international 
network (Kunitz, 2000; Niezen, 2000; Coates, 2004; Stew-
art-Harawira, 2005). Recent literature points to the grow-
ing significance of indigenous peoples’ involvement in the 
development of international law and human rights proce-
dures regarding indigenous rights (Jhappan, 1992; Have-
mann, 1999; Niezen, 2000; Coates, 2004; Stewart-Harawira, 
2005). Niezen (2000:112), referring to the indigenous peo-
ples’ movement as “indigenism,” states, “it represents a new 
use of international bodies of states to overcome the domes-
tic abuses of states themselves, while pursuing development 
and recognition of international standards concerning the 
rights of indigenous peoples.” the capacity of grassroots 
Native resistance groups to connect to “transnational advo-
cacy networks” (keck and sikkink, 1998) and enter the 
political processes of states and the global world order is 
what Stahler-Sholk (2001) and Gills (2000) call “globaliza-
tion from below.” 
Native grassroots activists make use of information and 
communication technologies to forge alliances with other 
indigenous minorities and non-state actors, share perspec-
tives and resources, and increase their visibility in both 
international arenas (Kunitz, 2000; Niezen, 2000; Coates, 
2004; stewart-Harawira, 2005) and domestic ones (clark, 
2002; Hodgins et al., 2003; ishiyama, 2003; Gedicks, 2004). 
as coates (2004:259) states, “the more archaic world of 
email and the internet allows groups to spread news of dan-
gers and crises around the globe within minutes, thus mobi-
lizing public protests in ways unimaginable a few years 
ago.” For example, the use of electronic media by indigenous 
activists during the Zapatista rebellion in chiapas, Mexico, 
was effective in creating a connection between the “local 
and the global,” thereby making state abuses visible to the 
world (stahler-sholk, 2001:501). thus, indigenous political 
struggles are “placed-based, yet transnationalised” (Esco-
bar, 2004:222), where the “translocal” can be used strate-
gically for local needs and aspirations (castree, 2004:163). 
The formation of a global indigenous identity (Niezen, 
2000) is also referred to as “glocalization…the (re)consti-
tution of identities and organizations rooted in local places 
but simultaneously global in nature” (Perreault, 2003:83).
some scholars take a closer look at the dynamics 
involved at the state level, where indigenous social move-
ments tend to operate (see clark, 2002; ishiyama, 2003; 
Gedicks, 2004). they draw particular attention to the forces 
of colonialism and state capitalism that influence indig-
enous political struggles and underscore efforts taken by 
local grassroots activists to engage in community action 
and alliance building (both locally and state-wide). Hodgins 
et al. (2003:162) explore anishinabe peoples’ use of peace-
ful blockades and resistance against exogenous pressures 
for resource extraction and development on their traditional 
lands. the authors discuss the use of “non-violent strategic 
action” and “surprising the enemy” as political tactics that 
are effective in both discouraging a powerful opponent and 
generating public scrutiny of the routine violence that char-
acterizes the status quo. The Oka Crisis in 1990 (Ciaccia, 
2000) and the occupation of ipperwash Provincial Park by 
the stoney Point First Nation in 1995 (Edwards, 2001) illus-
trate indigenous groups’ use of more aggressive forms of 
direct action in their political struggles. However, the use 
of violent political action, particularly in a post-9/11 con-
text, “generally generates surprise but little support [for the 
group], and indeed, may strengthen its enemies” (Hodgins 
et al., 2003:162). 
in northern Quebec, large-scale hydroelectric develop-
ment associated with the James Bay Project has had signifi-
cant impacts on the natural environment, as well as on the 
lives and livelihoods of several cree communities (berkes, 
1988; Niezen, 1993, 1998; Rosenberg et al., 1995, 1997; 
Ettenger, 1998; Hornig, 1999; scott, 2001; Feit, 2004a; 
Whiteman, 2004). the inadequacy of the James bay and 
Northern Quebec agreement in addressing these impacts 
has been detailed elsewhere (Mulrennan and scott, 2005). 
the signing of the agreement concerning a New Relation-
ship between the Quebec crees and Quebec Government 
(7 February 2002) was intended to establish a new “nation-
to-nation” relationship “based on respect and mutual har-
mony” between the cree and Quebec nations and provides 
for greater involvement of crees in overseeing the man-
agement of natural resources and development projects in 
the region (Feit, 2004a; scott, 2005). according to scott 
(2005), the accommodations and provisions secured under 
the New agreement emanate from the emergence of a 
strong regional political organization and greater access to 
various political resources at national and transnational lev-
els, including international judicial and governing organi-
zations (e.g., the United Nations), environmental and human 
rights groups, and the media. While the achievements of the 
regional cree leadership in protecting and promoting cree 
rights and interests are widely recognized, the contribu-
tions of individuals and organizations operating at the local 
community level have tended to go unacknowledged. this 
article therefore has a local focus: it explores the various 
political discourses and strategies used by members of the 
Nemaska cree community in their efforts to articulate their 
concerns and effectively engage in political action to pro-
test the EM-1-a & Rupert Diversion Project. 
the case study presented is based on a literature review 
and field research centred on Nemaska over a two-year 
period (see Fig. 1), during which the senior author was an 
active participant in the local resistance movement (see 
atkinson, 2008). Nemaska is the smallest cree community 
in eastern James bay, northern Quebec, with a population 
of 642 people (statistics canada, 2006a). Field research 
involved observation of participants and a series of semi-
structured and unstructured interviews; the snowballing 
approach was used to select participants (Flowerdew and 
Martin, 2006). interviews targeted employees in educa-
tional and administrative positions, elders, tallymen (tally-
men or amiskuchimaaw are senior hunters and trappers who 
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FiG. 1. Map of James bay, showing the location of the study communities of Nemaska, Waskaganish, Eastmain, Wemindji, and chisasibi, as well as the Rupert, 
Nottaway, and broadback rivers. (courtesy of Jesse sayles, indian ocean World center, McGill university, Montreal, Quebec.)
Waskaganish Nemaska
Wemindji
Chisasibi 
Projection: Lambert NAD83. Created by J.Sayles, 2009.
Hydrology: CanVec 250K, Natural Resources Canada, 2008.
Roads: Atlas of Canada, Natural Resources Canada, 2008.
Towns: Atlas of Canada, Natural Resources Canada, 2003.
Inset: Hare, T., P, Hern Jr., and P. Schruben. Global GIS Database: 
Digital Atlas of the Earth. U.S. Geological Survey, 2003.
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serve as stewards of a designated family hunting territory 
or trapline, Whiteman and cooper, 2000), and youth. in 
addition, we maintained regular contact through phone con-
versations with some members of the cree community after 
completion of the actual fieldwork in James Bay. Freddy 
Jolly, our key informant, and Roger orr agreed to have their 
names used in this article. others are quoted anonymously.
cREE MobiLiZatioN FoR REsistaNcE 
to HyDRo DEvELoPMENt: aN ovERviEW
James Bay–Phases 1 (La Grande) and 2 (Great Whale) 
In 1971, Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa officially 
announced plans to construct large hydroelectric power 
stations on several major rivers flowing into James Bay. 
Responsibility to administer hydroelectric development in 
the region was granted to the James bay Energy corpora-
tion and James bay Development corporation, both sub-
sidiaries of Hydro-Quebec, a Quebec crown corporation 
(Salisbury, 1986; Maxwell et al., 1997). Given that social 
and environmental impact assessments were not required at 
the time under Quebec or canadian law (Peters, 1999; Feit, 
2004a), the James bay crees had little recourse in address-
ing the detrimental social and environmental consequences 
of the project (see, for example, Rosenberg et al., 1995; 
Hornig, 1999). they went to court to oppose construction 
of the first phase (La Grande) of the James Bay hydroelec-
tric development project and, along with the inuit, sought 
an injunction in 1972 from the Superior Court of Quebec to 
halt construction (Niezen, 1998; Hornig, 1999; Peters, 1999). 
after a lengthy period of testimony by cree hunters about 
their ongoing use and occupation of the lands and resources 
of their traditional territories, superior court Judge albert 
Malouf declared in favour of the crees and recommended 
that federal and provincial governments negotiate a settle-
ment with the crees before resuming construction work 
on the project. the Malouf decision was overturned on 
appeal one week later, forcing the crees to negotiate an out-
of-court settlement with the governments of Quebec and 
canada, as well as with Hydro-Quebec and its subsidiar-
ies (Salisbury, 1986; Niezen, 1998; Hornig, 1999). In 1975, 
the James bay and Northern Quebec agreement was signed 
by the crees, the inuit, and the governments of Quebec and 
Canada. This event marked the first modern comprehensive 
land claim settlement in canada. under the agreement, the 
crees obtained different levels of access rights to resources 
and wildlife harvesting under a three-tiered land regime, 
substantial cash compensation, and local as well as regional 
self-government powers (salisbury, 1986; Hornig, 1999). in 
return, Quebec gained the right to pursue development in 
the region.
in 1986, Hydro-Quebec unveiled its plans to construct an 
additional project on the Great Whale River, located north 
of the La Grande watershed and upstream of the cree- 
inuit village of Whapmagoostui (cree for ‘great whale’), 
also known as kuujjuarapik (inuktitut for ‘little great 
river’). the perceived threat to the rivers, the animals, and 
their traditional way of life prompted the crees to launch a 
five-year international campaign that in combination with 
other factors, including the flawed economics of the project, 
led Quebec to cancel the hydroelectric project in 1994 (see 
Niezen, 1998; Jensen and Papillon, 2000; Feit, 2004a). With 
respect to resistance strategies applied, Jhappan (1992:85) 
underscores how New york state’s cancellation of a multi-
billion dollar (caD) power purchasing agreement with the 
Government of Quebec and Hydro-Quebec demonstrates 
the power of direct lobbying: “the case suggests that inter-
national politicking will be more effective when external 
actors can be enrolled as direct stakeholders in specific 
aboriginal disputes with canadian governments.” Further-
more, the Grand council of the crees (Gcc) participated 
in a conference on indigenous peoples convened by a uN 
Working Group on indigenous Populations to garner politi-
cal support for their grievances regarding canada’s failure 
to implement various provisions under the 1975 James Bay 
Agreement (Niezen, 2000). The GCC also went to the Inter-
national Water tribunal in amsterdam and to australia to 
contribute to a debate on public participation in environ-
mental issues (Jenson and Papillon, 2000). as a result of 
their efforts, the James bay crees gained a reputation as a 
politically sophisticated indigenous group that contributed 
to setting international standards in environmental protec-
tion and human rights (Niezen, 2000).
James Bay–Phase 3: A New Relationship
When the cree leaders signed the New agreement in 
2002, they gave their consent to an environmental assess-
ment and review process to be applied to the proposed 
EM-1-a & Rupert Diversion Project (see maps in HQ, 
2004), which includes the partial diversion of the Rupert 
River northward to the Eastmain-1 reservoir and from there 
to existing generating stations at the La Grande complex 
via the La Grande River (HQ, 2004). the crees also agreed 
not to oppose the Eastmain-1 development project (scott, 
2005). in return, the New agreement includes a cash com-
ponent of $3.5 billion (caD) to be dispensed over a 50-year 
period as part of Quebec’s obligations to contribute to com-
munity and economic development as stipulated in the 1975 
James bay agreement (Feit, 2004a; scott, 2005). Further-
more, the agreement gives the crees greater autonomy over 
the administration of cree communities, as well as more 
meaningful participation in assessments of development 
projects. it also provides for a new forestry regime, the joint 
management of parks and protected areas with Quebec, and 
shared revenues from hydro, mining, and forestry (Feit, 
2004a; scott, 2005).
another rationale for regional cree leaders’ consent 
to the Rupert Project was Quebec’s promise to shelve the 
originally conceived Nottaway-broadback-Rupert (NbR) 
complex—a much larger project that proposed the com-
plete diversion of the Rupert and Nottaway rivers into the 
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Broadback River and would have flooded 20 times the area 
that the current Rupert Diversion Project will flood (Feit, 
2004a). thus, the trade-off for the smaller and hence less 
environmentally destructive EM-1-a & Rupert Project is 
an added benefit to the Crees (Grand Council of the Crees, 
2002). also, the terms of the New agreement, outlined 
above, were considered more attractive than what had been 
on offer in the past (Gcc, 2002), especially in the context 
of a young, rapidly growing cree population in need of 
improved employment and other opportunities. 
some crees, however, speculated that the Government 
of Quebec and Hydro-Quebec used the New agreement as 
leverage to gain the support and cooperation of the crees for 
the project. For example, chief Josy Jimiken of Nemaska 
made the following statement to the Federal Review Panel: 
I have even heard it from certain Cree officials who 
are in positions of authority, and basically, the message 
to some of our people has been that if there are any 
expressions of opposition to this proposed diversion 
project, that there will be repercussions, that there 
will be consequences. there will probably even be 
the possibility of benefits being denied from this New 
Relationship agreement… .
(Federal Review Panel and Review committee 
(COMEX), Vol.7, 2006:39)
scheduled for completion by 2012, the EM-1-a & Rupert 
Project represents a $5-billion (caD) dollar investment that 
will produce approximately 800 mW of energy. this energy 
signifies a substantial increase in gross electrical produc-
tion in Quebec and is expected to create thousands of direct 
and indirect jobs over the next decade (HQ, 2004). Given 
that unemployment levels in cree communities continue to 
rise, securing job opportunities has been a major motivation 
for the cree leadership (HQ, 2004; scott, 2005). the unem-
ployment rate for the cree population is roughly 25% (of a 
labour force of 7500), and it doubles in the 15–24 age group 
(cree Regional authority, 2006). this rate is well above 
the 6.6% federal and 7.0% provincial averages for Canada 
(statistics canada, 2006b).
Despite Quebec Premier Jean charest’s declaration that 
the EM-1-a & Rupert Project represents a step forward in 
efforts to produce clean and renewable forms of energy (see 
CBC, 2007), many Crees are concerned about the long-term 
effects on the land and on their traditional harvesting activ-
ities. However, unlike the Great Whale Project, to which 
regional and local levels of Cree organizations were united 
in their opposition, the EM-1-a & Rupert Project generated 
internal divisions that had the effect of immobilizing Cree 
communities. the defeat of the Grand chief and chief nego-
tiator for the New agreement, ted Moses, in a september 
2005 election, and his replacement by Matthew Mukash, 
who fought against the Great Whale project in the 1980s, 
reflect some of the internal politics the project has gener-
ated within the cree Nation. along with several other cree 
leaders, Mukash has been critical of the proposed project 
and favours the construction of wind turbines for energy 
production as an alternative to diverting the Rupert River 
(bonspiel, 2004). the proposed hydro expansion also pro-
voked debate within cree communities and fueled criticism 
directed against the local and regional leadership. in the 
community of Nemaska, a local resistance group was estab-
lished in response.
NEMaska cREE REactioN, MobiLiZatioN
aND REsistaNcE to tHE EM-1-a
aND RuPERt DivERsioN PRoJEct
Local Reaction 
The field research that informs our analysis of the 
Nemaska resistance movement began in June 2002, only 
a few months after the signing of the New agreement and 
amidst the controversy over the Rupert Diversion Project. 
initial conversations and interviews conducted by the senior 
author with the Nemaska crees indicated that many local 
people were dissatisfied with the new deal. Some communi-
cated a sense of betrayal by the cree leadership because the 
agreement in Principle (aiP) made in october 2001, which 
subsequently led to the signing of the New agreement in 
February 2002, was negotiated in secrecy between the Gcc 
and Quebec officials. One former Nemaska Band employee 
expressed his dissatisfaction with the lack of transparency 
shown by the local cree leadership throughout the negoti-
ating process: “there is change in the community and the 
way we work as a community.” an employee of the cree 
Regional authority expressed similar frustrations with the 
regional leadership: 
When the news first came out, my friends and i 
couldn’t believe it. i called my dad and then checked 
on the internet. i felt betrayed right away, and i started 
questioning our leadership. it really hurt me inside, and 
i almost cried when i heard about it. My friends and i 
began reviewing it to find ways to oppose it: to find an 
opposition plan…We felt that we could do something 
better.... so i made the decision to come home from 
school in North Bay to fight the project. I began to 
work with the opposition here in Nemaska and other 
communities.
 
other Nemaska crees were critical of events leading 
up to the community referenda for the signing of the New 
agreement for several reasons. First, public involvement in 
the community consultation hearings was limited because 
many crees, especially the elders and tallymen, were in the 
bush hunting and trapping during the winter months when 
the hearings were being held. second, a two-month time-
frame to make a decision on the new deal was considered 
by many to be unreasonable and insufficient to fully under-
stand the implications of diverting the Rupert River. third, 
the GCC was criticized for its failure to acknowledge the 
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emergence of a local opposition group, when Gcc acknowl-
edgement might have legitimized the group’s stance on 
the Rupert River issue. Oblin (2007:97) made the follow-
ing observation about the community hearings on the aiP: 
“Responses from cree leaders and administrators to expres-
sions of anti-aiP sentiments, however, often seemed defen-
sive and at times antagonistic…those who opposed were 
at times dismissed as marginal, provocative, and unrep-
resentative of the majority of the Cree.” Oblin (2007) also 
pointed out that even many supporters of the aiP were crit-
ical of the process by which the agreement was achieved.
Furthermore, some crees felt that the low rate of par-
ticipation in the public referenda for the New agreement 
(which had a 56% turnout rate: 38% voted in favour of the 
New Agreement, 17% voted against, and 44% did not vote, 
see Gcc, 2005), made the legitimacy of the new deal rather 
questionable. it is also noteworthy that the public referen-
dum in each community was held three years before Hydro-
Quebec tabled its impact study on the Rupert River Project, 
which made it difficult for Crees to make an informed deci-
sion on the issue (cree Nations of Nemaska, chisasibi and 
Waskaganish, 2006). 
Local protest over the Rupert River Project and the New 
Agreement was documented in the film, “One More River: 
the Deal that split the cree,” directed by Neil Diamond and 
Tracey Deer (Rezolution Pictures, 2004; Bonspiel, 2005). 
criticism of the cree leadership cited the secrecy of negoti-
ations with Quebec for the aiP; the failure to acknowledge 
the lack of consensus within the communities prior to the 
signing of the New agreement; the surrender of cree sover-
eignty over resource development; and the fact that opening 
up the territory to hydro, forestry, and mining could con-
tribute to encroachment issues and impose further restric-
tions upon cree traditional subsistence activities. in defence 
of the cree leadership, a spokesperson for the Gcc pointed 
out that the New agreement would make a strong contribu-
tion to the promotion of economic progress and quality of 
life for the crees:
 
Where would the 125 crees work who are presently 
working…at the troilus Mine? What about the crees 
working in forestry? What about the more than 500 
crees who work on the EM1 project? What about all of 
the non-crees working in the territory? Would they and 
Quebec and canada just acquiesce to cree demands that 
they be allowed to close the door on the rest of the world? 
Not likely! it seems that a minority of people, such as 
the “Un-Official opposition” are willing to sacrifice the 
well-being of many others to further their own agenda, 
even when the people vote the other way. 
(Gcc, 2005)
 
this statement conveys the Gcc’s perspective on the 
project as a much needed, reliable source of income for the 
cree Nation.
Not all Nemaska crees are opposed to the new deal and 
the hydroelectric expansion project. indeed many local 
residents expressed ambivalence about the project, sug-
gesting that they feel torn between losing the river—and 
with it, important ties to their culture and history—and the 
economic benefits of large-scale development. For exam-
ple, many community members who supported the hydro 
project acknowledged the significance of the cultural loss 
but said that given the benefits and their urgency for the 
cree population, they accepted the loss as an inevitable sac-
rifice. The EM-1 and EM-1-A projects involve significant 
economic gains for the cree Nation; the former provided 
employment for approximately 400 crees (cRa, 2006), and 
the construction phase for the latter is expected to gener-
ate about 1052 person-years of employment over a five-year 
period and inject the equivalent of roughly $105 million 
(caD) into the cree communities (HQ, 2004). 
Local ambivalence about the project was further com-
pounded by the level of confusion and controversy within 
the affected communities concerning the environmental 
review process for the project. the following statements 
made during the community consultation hearings capture 
the sense of frustration and uncertainty experienced:
all of a sudden, everything is being accelerated…the 
same way that La Paix des braves [New agreement] was 
accelerated, the consultation process with the people 
was so fast the next thing you know it was signed… i 
also see the same thing for the environmental impact 
assessment process.” 
(Diane Ried, Waskaganish, coMEv, 2003:13)
today, even with this environmental review process, 
i believe still, it’s still not a fair process….Numerous 
deadlines imposed upon the crees…make no sense…
this month, we were expected to review a three 
thousand-page study, which is practically impossible.
 (Jeremy Diamond, Nemaska,
coMEX, vol. 6, 2006:63)
there are many people here who don’t understand what 
these experts are talking about because they don’t know 
what it means, they don’t know these parts per million or 
what is going to happen with this water contamination.
(Richard Tent, Nemaska, COMEX, Vol. 7, 2006:123)
and people, i guess, they have questions still today 
because they’re not sure, like me, i’m not sure what is 
going on, i’m right in between. i’m not with yes, i’m not 
with no: i’m right in between….
(Greg Jolly, Nemaska, COMEX, Vol. 7, 2006:17)
the above quotations show the general impression 
among many crees that the signing of the New agreement 
rendered the project “a done deal” and reduced the envi-
ronmental review process to a meaningless bureaucratic 
exercise, which in turn contributed to local uncertainty and 
ambivalence about the project.
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Local Mobilization
the establishment of a local opposition group at 
Nemaska in 2001 coincided with the community consulta-
tion phase for the negotiation of the New agreement (see 
One More River, Rezolution Pictures, 2004). The group 
consisted of nine members, most of them employed in gov-
ernment and administrative positions, including the chief of 
Nemaska. Given that a majority of local community resi-
dents and Band Council officials supported the project (in 
a public referendum for the New agreement), and that the 
GCC advised local officials not to oppose the New Agree-
ment publicly (One More River, Rezolution Pictures, 2004), 
the chief could not make the protest part of official Nemaska 
council business. another active member of the group was 
a senior tallyman named Freddy Jolly. as the tallyman 
whose trapline has been most severely affected by large-
scale economic development, Jolly has been a charismatic 
leader of local efforts to protect the land from environmen-
tal destruction and maintain the cree way of life. Jolly is 
well known for his outspoken and often contentious views 
about economic development and the depth of his own per-
sonal attachment to the land. He is admired by many for 
his unremitting energy and resolve and for taking up the 
cause against external intrusions on cree people, as well 
as their land and resources. During the 1990s, for example, 
he fought against the planned construction of the Route du 
Nord (North Road) by filing an application to the Quebec 
superior court to launch a class action lawsuit against Que-
bec, canada, the James bay Development corporation, and 
cree construction to request compensation for damages to 
his trapline and on behalf of roughly 250 trappers affected 
by the road (Nicholls, 1996). Jolly engaged in coalition 
building with other affected trappers in the region. using 
the local media (print and radio) to publicize the struggle, 
he contributed to growing support in the communities for 
trappers’ receiving compensation for damages to their trap-
lines. Jolly’s court case marked the first time a Cree had 
used the class action process for Native rights (carpenter, 
2008). 
another member of the local opposition group is Roger 
orr, a dedicated activist and environmentalist committed 
to increasing local awareness about the potential impacts 
of the project and mobilizing fellow Crees to challenge it. 
orr works for social services in Nemaska as a counselor 
on alcohol and drug prevention and also provides support 
through his job as counselor for the National Native alco-
hol and Drug addictions Program. 
The group maintained an informal organizational struc-
ture, and decision-making responsibilities were shared 
among all group members. Only one official meeting was 
ever convened, in June 2004. its purpose was to devise strat-
egies for a public challenge to the EM-1-a & Rupert Diver-
sion Project and draw community attention to the potential 
short- and long-term impacts of hydro development. 
the senior author, a non-Native researcher from Mon-
treal, Quebec, was invited to attend and participate in this 
meeting because of her several years of professional and 
personal engagement with the Nemaska community, which 
included her employment as a local high school teacher. in 
this capacity, she helped organize a student field trip to the 
EM-1 hydro construction site in June 2004 to provide local 
youth with a more informed perspective on the nature and 
scale of hydroelectric development in the region. she also 
participated in many social and cultural events in the com-
munity, including a 100 km snowshoe walk with Nemaska 
crees along the Rupert River in March 2005. Finally, she 
spent several weeks on the Jolly family trapline, during 
which time she participated in sturgeon fish studies on the 
Rupert River as part of the feasibility studies for the impact 
assessment process of the project. through these experi-
ences, she gained a highly textured perspective on local 
concerns related to the project and was identified by the 
opposition group as someone committed to environmental 
protection and cultural continuity.
through their combined knowledge, skills, and experi-
ence, the group developed a capacity for political action. 
For instance, by having access to phones and computers at 
home and work, group members made use of various politi-
cal tools associated with information and communication 
technologies (internet, websites, coalition building and 
media tactics). they also forged alliances with other Native 
and non-Native individual activists and organizations, 
including the Rupert Reverence coalition, which pledged its 
assistance with media relations and press releases, as well 
as protest-related costs such as satellite phone rental, food, 
and gas. the fact that some members, particularly Jolly and 
orr, had previously been involved in acts of protest created 
a knowledge base that informed and legitimated the kinds 
of resistance strategies devised by the group. 
Despite this knowledge base, time and resource limita-
tions imposed significant constraints on the ability of the 
group to organize and carry out its activities. These con-
straints also prevented the establishment of a larger net-
work of supporters at national and international levels. at 
the local community level, the regional political climate 
surrounding the Rupert River Project, combined with an 
overall lack of political solidarity among community mem-
bers, limited the ability of the group opposing the project to 
mobilize local support. 
Eight different strategies were used by the opposition 
group, in isolation or in combination:
 1. Organize a protest walk: A protest walk led by Freddy 
Jolly was intended to mobilize the Cree communities 
against the Rupert River Project and attract media cov-
erage that would capture public attention and support 
beyond the cree territory. 
 2. confront the regional cree leadership at the annual 
General assembly (aGa): this strategy was intended 
to exert political pressure on the cree leadership to pro-
mote alternative forms of development consistent with 
sustainable management and development objectives. 
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 3. initiate, build, and strengthen alliances with activists 
and environmental groups located outside the cree ter-
ritory: the objective behind this strategy was to raise 
national and international awareness of their concerns 
and thereby gain additional support and political lever-
age vis-à-vis project decision makers. 
 4. Engage, build, and strengthen alliances with the neigh-
bouring cree communities of chisasibi and Waskagan-
ish: chisasibi has borne the heaviest impacts of Phase 
1, but both communities will be affected by the pro-
posed project. collaboration with these communities 
was intended to provide meaningful firsthand accounts 
of the impacts of hydro projects, strengthen the voice of 
the opposition group to gain the support of neighbouring 
communities, and allow the group to scale up its protest 
actions from the local to a regional level. 
 5. Promote wind energy as an alternative to the Rupert 
River Project: this particular strategy served the dual 
role of bringing the controversy surrounding the Rupert 
River Project to the aGa and putting the issue of alter-
native energy sources on the cree political agenda. 
 6. use information and communication technologies 
(internet/e-mail, websites, and media tactics) to support 
protest efforts: technology is particularly helpful to coor-
dinate actions and facilitate the exchange of resources 
and information with other groups and organizations and 
to make the protest and resistance more visible outside 
the cree communities. 
 7. Use the public consultation process for the environ-
mental impact assessment of the project: this strategy 
allowed the group to use the public hearings as a plat-
form to voice their views and concerns about the project 
to an audience of Cree, government, and proponent offi-
cials, as well as to the rest of the community. 
 8. identify weaknesses and gaps in the technical studies for 
the environmental impact study: the objective in this 
strategy was to publicly embarrass the project proponent 
and to delay, if not stop, the project.
 
Local Resistance: A Cree Tallyman Walks to Save the 
Rupert River 
People ask me if i still believe that we can win. i tell 
them that nobody owns the river. that includes the 
chiefs that signed the agreement. it’s by watching over 
the land that we can save the Rupert River and those 
who use it.
Freddy Jolly (2004)
In June 2004, five members of the local opposition 
group, including the senior author, convened at the home of 
a group member to devise strategies to publicly challenge 
the EM-1-a & Rupert River Diversion Project. Freddy Jolly 
wanted to discuss a dream he had about leading a protest 
walk to the Parliament building in ottawa. He suggested 
that this public protest should involve Natives and non- 
Natives as well as the media and environmental and human 
rights organizations. Although most members supported 
Jolly’s proposal, one member of the group argued that a 
protest walk is a “soft” approach that would have minimal 
impact on the Gcc. this member suggested that a more 
powerful approach would be to confront the regional lead-
ership directly and employ political tactics that would “sur-
prise” the Gcc and startle the cree public. 
after some discussion and consultation with others, 
including a Montreal-based lawyer, a decision was taken to 
combine these strategies by organizing a protest walk from 
Nemaska to Wemindji in august 2004. Wemindji is a coastal 
cree community located at the mouth of the Maquatua 
River along the east coast of James bay, which, as the host 
community for the aGa, provided an opportunity to con-
front the regional leadership. at the same time, some mem-
bers of the group, including the chief of Nemaska, decided 
to investigate wind energy as an alternative to the Rupert 
River Project with the intention to present their findings to 
the Gcc at the aGa. these members forged alliances with 
chiefs and local residents at Waskaganish and chisasibi in 
support of this strategy. unfortunately, they failed to inform 
those group members involved in the protest walk of the 
plan to develop an alternative wind energy strategy. indeed, 
it was not until the others arrived in Wemindji in august for 
the aGa, armed with booklets of information about alter-
native energy sources, that the protest walk group became 
aware of this strategy. 
on 2 august 2004, Freddy Jolly and Roger orr left 
Nemaska for a 14-day, 456 km protest walk to Wemindji 
to publicize their objection to the EM-1-A & Rupert Diver-
sion Project. They arrived in Wemindji on 17 August 2004, 
day three of the aGa. Jolly used the opportunity to speak 
freely to the panel of cree leaders and cree people present. 
He talked about the significance of the Rupert River for 
the well-being of the crees and future generations and the 
potential for alternative modes of energy production in the 
region, particularly wind energy. His speech was aired on 
the regional cree radio station. afterwards a large number 
of participants at the assembly, including the then Deputy 
Grand chief of the Grand council of the crees, Mr. Paul 
Gaul, and other members of the cree leadership, lined up 
to shake hands with Jolly, respectful and appreciative of the 
opposition group’s mission and achievements.
calling for a delay of the feasibility studies of the 
EM-1-a & Rupert Project, former chief Robert Weistche 
of Waskaganish, along with other members of the opposi-
tion group that had worked on the alternative wind energy 
strategy, tabled a proposal for an “Eeyou istchee commis-
sion on Energy” (see Nicholls, 2004). this plan included 
a resolution to explore alternative, environmentally sound 
sources of energy on James bay territory. it is noteworthy 
that this resolution subsequently contributed to tangible 
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developments in this field; for example, the community of 
chisasibi, along with a toronto-based company, has since 
developed a framework to build a wind energy project that, 
if realized, would become Canada’s largest wind farm (see 
bonspiel, 2004). a cree Nation of Nemaska “Working 
Group on Energy and sustainable Development” (WGEsD) 
has also been established. Jolly attributes some credit for 
these developments to the protest walk: 
they passed a resolution about wind power. i remember 
at the end i was talking to them about wind power. 
Like i said to them, we should stop [the] joint venture 
with Hydro-Quebec building dams. We should think 
about wind energy. and sure enough they started and 
now they’re out there having meetings. and they go to 
toronto and they go anywhere. and if i didn’t do that 
walk, nobody would start talking about wind power.
 
Despite these developments and the warm reception 
given to Jolly and other members of the opposition, the pro-
test walk was not the success Jolly and others had hoped it 
would be. While the regional leaders applauded the protest-
ers’ efforts, they were unwilling to revise their position on 
the Rupert Project. Jolly spoke of his personal disappoint-
ment in the days following the walk: “they [the chiefs] 
didn’t walk beside me when i reached Wemindji. i was 
waiting for them and i didn’t see them.” 
Local involvement in the walk to save the river also fell 
short of the opposition group’s expectations. While orr’s 
wife and a non-Native teacher at Nemaska accompanied 
them for short stretches on the Route du Nord, Jolly and orr 
were the only Nemaska crees to walk the long stretch on 
the James bay highway. other crees and non-Natives driv-
ing on the highway stopped to greet Jolly and orr and give 
them encouragement. the protesters also met with then 
Grand chief ted Moses, who was en route to the cree com-
munity of Eastmain to attend the 30th anniversary of the 
Gcc. Moses and his family also took time to talk with Jolly 
and orr. 
When asked for his reaction to the limited number of 
active supporters they had for the walk, Jolly gave the fol-
lowing response: “there are times i’m sad about my peo-
ple because they’re asleep, they’re silent….” orr expressed 
a similar reaction to the poor turnout: “i remember when 
we got to the turn-off [road] to Wemindji. it was just the 
two of us, and everything around us was still. i had a weird 
feeling, and i turned to Freddy and asked him, “Do you get 
the feeling that it’s just you and me on this earth?” (pers. 
comm. 2007). The following morning, four more support-
ers from the communities of Wemindji and chisasibi, as 
well as one american and the senior author, joined Jolly 
and orr to walk the last stretch to Wemindji. a camera 
crew from Maamuitaau, the cbc North’s weekly cree- 
language magazine, also arrived that morning to document 
the protest. as we walked, a police cruiser escorted us to the 
building where the aGa was being held. Within Wemindji, 
a small crowd of local residents had gathered on the street, 
demonstrating their support by cheerfully applauding the 
efforts of the protesters. the crowd joined us as we made 
our way to the assembly.
a strategy similar to the protest walk, also aimed at rais-
ing the profile of the Rupert political struggle, took the form 
of a public protest on the Rupert River near Waskagan-
ish the following summer. this public demonstration was 
organized by the Rupert Reverence Coalition, an environ-
mental group composed of crees and Jamesians (non-Native 
residents of towns located within the James bay Municipal-
ity), as well as environmentalists and concerned citizens 
from the south. the focus of the event was a group of pad-
dlers traveling downriver to the cree village of Waskagan-
ish and into Rupert bay. With the exception of the chief, 
no one from the community joined the protest group. yet 
the symbolic significance of the demonstration did not go 
unacknowledged by local residents. For example, an elder 
reported to the senior author that despite the project being 
well under way at that stage and the futility of further pro-
tests to save the river, the chief’s demonstration of his per-
sonal commitment to the river sent an important message to 
the community. 
a central aspect of protest strategies such as the walk 
and the public demonstration is the media attention they 
attract. committed efforts were made following the pro-
test walk to draw media attention to “Jolly’s fight to save 
the Rupert River.” the senior author, with assistance from 
members of the Rupert Reverence coalition, crafted catchy 
headlines for press releases: “cree tallyman walks 456 km 
to save the Rupert River.” “David meets Goliath: Grand 
chief ted Moses wishes Freddy luck on his quest to save the 
Rupert River.” these efforts, as well as the involvement of 
a New yorker who had previously opposed the Great Whale 
Project and joined the protest walk to Wemindji, harnessed 
the attention of 20 print and radio media outlets, including 
the canadian broadcasting corporation (cbc); the Mon-
treal Gazette; the tataskweyak cree Nation from split 
Lake, Manitoba; and Cultural Survival, a non-profit indig-
enous rights organization based in Massachusetts, USA. 
an important aspect of the media strategy was the focus 
given to Jolly’s personal commitment to fight the Rupert 
Project. the editor of the Nation magazine expressed his 
appreciation of Jolly’s dedication and determination in the 
following terms: “i have to admire Jolly. He keeps coming 
back year after year trying to stop the degradation of his 
trapline. you can see it pains him to see anything happen 
to it and that the pain is very real” (Nicholls, 2004). Despite 
the hopelessness of the protest and the low turnout of sup-
porters on the walk, Jolly’s resolve to continue the fight was 
unrelenting: 
the media that called me, they said to me “Do you still 
have a chance to save the river, even if the chiefs signed 
[?]” i told them this way, “i’m not alone.” When i started 
walking from Nemaska, everything…it’s just like the 
river was following me. and i began to see [and] hear 
everything that i’m standing up for, everything on the 
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land, on the river, in the air, they were walking with me, 
and i wasn’t alone. that’s how blind they are. they only 
look at one person.”
While the protest walk was the central strategy applied 
by the opposition group in their resistance of the Rupert 
River Project, it was not applied in isolation. the approach 
to applying other strategies, and their achievements and 
limitations, are discussed below. 
DiscussioN
the objective of the protest walk was to capture the hearts 
of the cree people and to encourage them to challenge the 
Rupert River Diversion Project. the walk generated inter-
est from several environmental groups and organizations 
beyond the region that subsequently threw their support 
and some resources behind local cree initiatives to save the 
Rupert River. However, the walk was less effective in gen-
erating regional and local level resistance. Given the strong 
support the regional leadership had declared for the project, 
some crees saw the protest walk to save the river as a divi-
sive threat to regional solidarity. in retrospect, a more effec-
tive approach to rallying local support might have involved 
a greater focus by the local opposition group on increasing 
local awareness and education about the potential impacts of 
the project before initiating the protest walk. in this respect, 
the wind energy proposal would certainly have contributed 
to the discussion of feasible alternatives to the project if it 
had been incorporated into a more open and accessible pub-
lic communication strategy. this public communication, in 
turn, might also have increased the visibility and credibility 
of the local opposition group. 
the Nemaska opposition group demonstrated the capac-
ity to forge a grassroots network of individuals and organ-
izations within and outside the Cree communities that 
worked to organize and support each other. For exam-
ple, some members of the Nemaska group joined forces 
with chiefs and residents at Waskaganish and chisasibi to 
research wind energy as an alternative to the Rupert River 
Project. this initiative led to the establishment of the Work-
ing Group on Energy and sustainable Development, with 
Nemaska chief Josy Jimiken as its president. Despite some 
success in raising the profile of the Rupert Project at the 
aGa, the strategy to promote wind energy had limited 
capacity to enlist local community support because poor 
communication limited the circulation of information about 
this strategy. in terms of knowledge-sharing and team-
work within the group, some members felt excluded from 
the decision-making loop. thus, although the wind energy 
strategy was successful in building alliances with other 
cree communities, it failed to connect with local residents 
at Nemaska and served to alienate some members of the 
opposition group.
the local resistance movement also established alliances 
with larger environmental groups outside cree territory. For 
example, collaboration with the Rupert Reverence coalition 
was essential to their efforts to initiate the protest walk to 
Wemindji. A particularly valuable asset was the organiza-
tion’s extensive experience in media relations. However, a 
language barrier created a major challenge to creating and 
maintaining alliance networks between the coalition group 
and the Nemaska resistance group. the fact that most mem-
bers of the Rupert Reverence coalition are French-speak-
ing hampered their efforts to communicate with the cree 
public and enlist local support. thus, the coalition group 
relied heavily on the collaboration of members of the local 
opposition to draw support from the local community. the 
presence or absence of liaison persons, such as the senior 
author, to facilitate exchanges between coalition members 
and local opposition groups became critical to maintain the 
alliance. 
the Rupert Reverence coalition was, however, effec-
tive in mobilizing other environmental groups to assist in 
the Rupert River struggle. For example, Quebec movie star 
and co-founder of the Rivers Foundation, Roy Dupuis, vis-
ited Jolly’s trapline on various occasions and committed his 
support. Organizations such as the Sierra Club of Canada 
also got involved. 
the use of information and communication technologies 
also contributed to this mobilization effort. For example, 
websites like the one launched by the Nemaska, Waskagan-
ish, and chisasibi communities brought together a host of 
groups and organizations from Canada, the United States, 
and overseas to raise awareness about environmental pro-
tection in the context of the Rupert River. an online peti-
tion and a list server then allowed these distant supporters 
to become more actively involved. Jolly acknowledges the 
significance of this support: “People are emailing from 
all over [the world]. Like i said, let the spirit of the Rupert 
River flow. That’s how it is, you spread the word.”
at the local level, public announcements of the protest 
walk were broadcast on regional radio and published in the 
Nation magazine. This served to inform the nine Cree com-
munities and encourage the exchange of ideas on the Rupert 
Project, as well as to rally local support. the use of inter-
net and e-mail was useful in establishing a connection with 
other Native groups facing the negative impacts of external 
development on their lands. in particular, it served to inform 
other local communities of the various strategies of protest 
and resistance employed by Nemaska crees. For example, 
the Nemaska opposition group received an e-mail from the 
tataskweyak cree Nation in split Lake, Manitoba, a com-
munity that is currently debating its involvement in a hydro 
dam project. the community is seeking to join forces with 
the Nemaska crees, as well as other Native and non-Native 
groups and organizations, to create a broader network of 
resistance against hydroelectric projects and other types of 
industrial development that pose substantial environmental 
risks and challenges. 
With respect to the public consultation process, the public 
hearings for the environmental assessment of the EM-1-a 
& Rupert Diversion Project allowed members of the local 
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opposition at Nemaska to voice their concerns about the 
proposed development project to a wider audience. How-
ever, as mentioned earlier, this process was inadequate for a 
variety of reasons, as reflected in the Review Panel’s recom-
mendation to proceed with the proposed project (see cana-
dian Environmental assessment agency, 2006) despite the 
fact that many concerns raised during the hearings were not 
adequately addressed. This experience confirms the ongo-
ing need for local communities to avail of alternative strate-
gies for protest and resistance. 
another strategy used by the local opposition group was 
to hire technical advisors and independent consultants to 
conduct internal studies on the environmental impact study. 
For example, the communities of Nemaska, Waskagan-
ish, and chisasibi solicited the help of the Helios centre, a 
non-profit research group that provides independent exper-
tise on energy issues, to review and comment on Hydro- 
Quebec’s justification for the Rupert Project. The motiva-
tion behind this approach was to find weaknesses and gaps 
in the proponent’s technical studies. indeed, the Helios 
report to the Federal Review Panel concluded that the 
project could not be justified on grounds of Quebec’s future 
energy and security needs (Helios centre, 2006). although 
this strategy was effective in challenging the proponent’s 
findings, as well as in giving credibility to local concerns 
about the project, it ultimately had no apparent impact on 
the substance of the Review Panel’s final recommendations.
coNcLusioN
the control of and access to land and resources have 
long been and continue to be points of contention and 
often sources of conflict between indigenous peoples and 
the dominant society (clark, 2002). as the pace of intru-
sive, large-scale resource development on Native territories 
accelerates (scott, 2001; stewart-Harawira, 2005), the need 
for a better understanding of the pressures facing indig-
enous peoples becomes more urgent, especially in rela-
tion to their resistance to ecological crises caused by such 
development. 
While there is a growing literature on the emergence of 
indigenous resistance movements in response to externally 
imposed industrial development, little attention has been 
paid to the tensions that occur between local and regional 
levels of governance and within the indigenous communi-
ties themselves (Ishiyama, 2003 and Oblin, 2007 are excep-
tions). in general, competing ideologies and value systems 
contribute to conflicts (Ishiyama, 2003; Oblin, 2007). As 
Western capitalist modes and approaches become fur-
ther entrenched in indigenous systems of governance and 
functioning, and in the everyday lives of Native people, the 
search for balance between traditional beliefs and values 
and those of mainstream society often generates conflict 
over identity and legitimacy (Oblin, 2007). 
this study attempts to provide insight to indigenous 
political struggles by focusing on the local-regional dynam-
ics at play in the conflict over the EM-1-A & Rupert Diver-
sion Project in James Bay Cree territory. While the official 
position asserts that the cree Nation, by signing the New 
agreement, has lent its support to the Rupert River Project, 
our examination of cree local dynamics reveals a more 
complex political struggle within and between local and 
regional sites of power and identity. Feit (2004b:107) sug-
gests that the capacity of cree political leaders to oppose 
development and, at the same time, invite relationships with 
governments and industry, although seemingly contradic-
tory, is entirely consistent with cree strategies for “liv-
ing here and now.” in this sense, the willingness of crees 
to seek respectful relationships with developers should not 
be interpreted as a compromise or inconsistency but as 
“the means of re-creation of life projects and relationships 
for everyday living and survival in the midst of continuing 
destruction” (Feit, 2004b:108). Our findings do not exclude 
the possibility of the second interpretation. However, they 
also indicate that some crees, at least at the local level, 
interpret cree political decisions less favorably as compro-
mise or inconsistency. 
the need to understand indigenous peoples’ struggles 
within the historical and socio-political context of economic 
and industrial development has been underscored by many 
researchers (clark, 2002; coates, 2004; Gedicks, 2004; 
stewart-Harawira, 2005). With regard to our study, the 
impetus behind local resistance to the Rupert River Project 
was twofold. First, the sustained and ongoing impacts of 
the La Grande Project and related works (see for example 
Berkes, 1988) provided a powerful, firsthand appreciation 
of the likely implications and impacts of the Rupert River 
Project. second, weaknesses in the negotiation and public 
consultation processes were thought to have compromised 
the legitimacy of the New agreement, so that the consent 
granted in the New agreement did not in reality consti-
tute “free, prior and informed consent” (cree Nations of 
Nemaska, chisasibi and Waskaganish, 2006). this resist-
ance and internal division on the EM-1-a & Rupert Diver-
sion Project stands in marked contrast to the united front 
that characterized the successful Cree campaign against the 
Great Whale Project in the 1990s.
With construction of the EM-1-a & Rupert Project now 
well under way, the “battle to save the Rupert” is lost for-
ever. the lessons from local protest efforts may have some 
lasting legacy, however, in informing local strategies of 
resistance to the ongoing ecological degradation and cul-
tural loss imposed by large-scale industrial development 
in the region. beyond this, unanimous consent by crees on 
the New Relationship agreement (iNac, 2008) signed with 
canada illustrates the resilience of the cree Nation and the 
capacity of the cree leadership to resolve internal differ-
ences and move forward on a united front. 
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